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11.1 Objectives, Standards, and Assessments
11 .1. 1 Reasons for Combining Indicators into Indexes
In concurrence with much ofthe literature, this book argues that there is no
single proven and accepted cause of all observed business cycles. 1 Instead,
there are a number of plausible and not mutually exclusive hypotheses about
what can cause downturns and contractions, upturns and expansions. Simi-
larly, no single chain of symptoms exists that would invariably presage these
developments. Instead, there are a number offrequently observed regularities
that seem likely to persist and play important roles in business cycles but are
certainly not immutable. The study of modem economic history reveals a
mixture of unique and common characteristics in each recorded business
cycle. It also suggests that certain systematic changes in short-term macro-
dynamics can be linked to long-term changes in the economy's structure and
institutions and the government's role and policies.
All this combines to explain why it has proved so difficult to make progress
toward a unified theory of business cycles, despite the great ingenuity of the
theorists and considerable gains in tested knowledge achieved in the empirical
work on the subject. Now, for the same reasons, the performance ofindividual
indicators in any given period is apt to vary depending on which causal ele-
ments are dominant and how their working manifests itself. In particular,
some leading indicators tum out to be most operative and useful in one set of
conditions, and others in a different set. To increase the chances of getting
true signals and reduce those ofgetting false ones, it is therefore advisable to
rely on a reasonably diversified group of leading series with demonstrated
1. This section is based in part on Zamowitz and Boschan 1975a, as are some other paragraphs
ofthis chapter.
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predictive potential. This suggests combining selected leaders into an appro-
priately constructed index and monitoring changes in that index as well as in
its components on a regular basis. The argument can be readily generalized to
composite indexes of roughly coincident indicators and of lagging indicators
as well.
Second, the measurement errors in individual indicators are often large,
especially in the most recent observations based on preliminary data. To the
extent that the data errors in the different indicators are independent, the risk
of being misled can be reduced by evaluating the signals, not from anyone
series viewed in isolation, but from a number of related series. The latter,
however, must be sufficiently differentiated and not just provide different mea-
surements for essentially the same variables. This is because multiple count-
ing should be avoided inasmuch as it results in unintended overweighting of
some elements in an index.
The third reason is an enhancement of predictive ability that can be
achieved by the reduction ofpure "noise." In general, indicators tend to react
not only to sustained cyclical fluctuations but also to frequent disturbances of
all kinds, for example, major strikes and foreign wars. This is particularly
true of the sensitive leading indicators. Hence, the month-to-month changes
in these series (after elimination of any seasonal elements) usually reflect the
short erratic movements much more than the longer cyclical ones. By combin-
ing the series into an index, some of that noise is eliminated; that is, a well-
constructed composite index can be much smoother than any of its compo-
nents.
The corollary of these arguments for constructing indexes from selected
series with common timing patterns is that a failure ofan individual indicator
does not refute the method. Rather, such a failure merely impairs and, if re-
peated, ultimately invalidates the particular series concerned. Unless the
underlying economic process is significantly altered, the problem reduces to
getting a better representation for it by improving the series or replacing it
with one that would perform satisfactorily. On the other hand, even a failure
on a single occasion would have strong negative implications for the indicator
approach ifit extended to a whole set ofprincipal series combined in an index.
11.1.2 Criteria for the Evaluation ofIndicator Performance
Historically, six criteria were applied in assessing and selecting the NBER
cyclical indicators. They refer to the following questions:
1. How well understood and how important is the role in business cycles of
the variables represented by the data? (The judgment on this is quantified in
the score for economic significance.)
2. How well does the given series measure the economic variable orprocess
in question (statistical adequacy)?
3. How consistently has the series led (or coincided or lagged) at business
cycle peaks and troughs (timing at recessions andrevivals)?318 Chapter Eleven
4. How regularly have the movements in the specific indicator reflected the
expansions and contractions in the economy at large (conformity to historical
business cycles)?
5. How promptly can a cyclical tum in the series be distinguished from
directional change associated with shorter, irregular movements (smoothness,
which is inversely related to the degree ofstatistical noise)?
6. How promptly available are the statistics and how frequently are they
reported (currency or timeliness)?
A formal, detailed weighting scheme according to the above criteria was
first developed and applied in Moore and Shiskin 1967. In the Zamowitz and
Boschan studies (1975a, 1975b, 1975c), a revised version of the same ap-
proach was used. The scores for each ofthe six major characteristics and their
many relevant components were computed on the 0-to-l00 scale and then
combined into a total score by means ofthe weights. 2
The evaluation of economic significance is difficult and inevitably subjec-
tive; hence much ofit was handled by preselection, with the minimum accept-
able score set at 70%. The scores for all other criteria were based on essen-
tially objective statistical measures. Thus, the quality ofthe reporting system
is assessed according to whether it is set up directly for statistical purposes, is
a by-product ofan administrative system, or is nonexistent (as for series esti-
mated indirectly from related variables). Other aspects ofstatistical adequacy
include the coverage ofprocess (full enumeration, probability sample, other)
and of time period (full month, or 1 week, or 1 day per month, etc.); the
availability of estimates of sampling and reporting errors; the length of the
series and comparability over time (breaks are penalized); and the frequency
ofrevisions (none, once a reporting period, or more often). More recently, the
revisions were given a more elaborate treatment and a separate score reflecting
their relative size as well as frequency. 3
The cyclical timing performance ofan indicator is appraised mainly accord-
ing to the probability that the observed number of timing comparisons of a
given type will be equaled or exceeded by chance. The dispersion ofthe leads
and lags about their means is also taken into account but with a smaller weight
(of about 20% of the total timing score). The leads and lags of the series are
2. In 1967, the first four criteria received weights of20% each; the last two received weights of
10% each. The results referred to the period before 1966 (as far back as the data were available
but with a heavy preponderance ofthe evidence from the post-World War II years). The timing of
the indicators at peaks and troughs was handled symmetrically.
In 1975, criteria 1, 2, and 4 received weights of Y6 each, timing o/1s, smoothness ¥Is, and cur-
rency Yio. The results referred to the period 1947-70. An asymmetrical distribution ofthe cyclical
timing comparisons at peaks and troughs ofthe postwar period was applied. Cf. Moore and Shis-
kin 1967, pp. 22-27, and Zamowitz and Boschan 1975a, pp. 2-4.
3. For more detailed information on scoring for statistical adequacy, errors and revisions,
smoothness and currency, see chapter 13 below. Also, on these and the other scores for the com-
ponents ofthe 1966 and 1975 indexes, see Moore and Shiskin 1967 and Zarnowitz and Boschan
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measured at the NBER-established references dates for business cycle peaks
and troughs separateIy.
Conformity is evaluated by relating the number of business cycle phases
that are matched by the specific-cycle movements (expansions and contrac-
tions) in the given series to the total number ofphases covered and then com-
puting the probabilities for the observed records. Other elements of the con-
formity score are the frequencies of "extra" movements in the indicators that
do not match the phases of general business fluctuations and can result in
misleading "false signals." The amplitudes of cyclical changes in the series
are also accounted for here (the larger and more distinct movements score
higher). 4
Smoothness depends on the relationship between the irregular and the
trend-cycle components of the series adjusted for seasonal variation. Large
erratic variations are common among many leading indicators and constitute
the main defect in some. Smoothing the data with short, trailing moving av-
erages can be advantageous for some erratic series that have long leads and
high currency scores (i.e., are compiled frequently and released promptly).
To put it differently, trade-offrelationships exist between the smoothness, cur-
rency, and timing characteristics (e.g., moving averages increase smoothness
but reduce currency and possibly the lead times).
11.1.3 The Indicator Scores and Selection ofIndex Components
Table 11. 1 presents means and standard deviations ofeach ofthe principal
component scores and ofthe total scores for 108 cyclical indicators that were
regularly presented in BCD. These statistics refer to data for 1947-80. The
series are classified by cyclical timing (pt. A) and by economic process (pt.
B). Listed in part A are also the scores of the composite indexes of leading,
coincident, and lagging indicators as well as ofthe groups of series included
in each ofthese indexes.
The major purpose of the original scoring efforts in the mid-1960s and
again in the early 1970s was to help select the most consistently cyclical series
for the indicators section ofBCD. This explains in large part why the overall
average scores in the table (col. 8) are all relatively high and clustered. They
do not differ greatly across either the economic process or the cyclical timing
groups.
It is also to be noted that the differences between the component scores are
generally large and often significant but that they offset each other to a large
extent. For example, the leaders as a group rank well below the coinciders
with respect to smoothness, but the reverse obtains for revisions (see lines 1-
2 and 5-6). Production and income series (lines 20-21) score high on timing
4. Within the total score for conformity, probability gets a maximum of50, extra turns 30, and
amplitude 20 points.320 Chapter Eleven
Table 11.1 Means and Standard Deviations ofScores ofCyclical Indicators, 1947-80
Statistical Economic
Timing Conformity Smoothness Currency Adequacy Revisions Significance Total
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. CLASSIFIED BY CYCLICAL TIMING (108)
All Leading Series (47)
1 76 68 57 57 78 72 74 71
2 11 18 27 29 12 22 7 6
Components ofthe Leading Index (12)
3 79 72 68 80 75 65 74 74
4 10 16 20 10 8 30 9 5
AllRoughly Coincident Series (18)
5 86 77 87 57 80 52 82 78
6 18 7 15 28 8 18 11 8
Components ofthe Coincident Index (4)
7 95 82 95 74 77 40 88 82
8 5 4 10 13 5 16 5 6
All Lagging Series (26)
9 81 72 85 62 75 82 78 77
10 16 15 17 32 13 20 5 6
Components ofthe Lagging Index (6)
11 86 71 87 75 73 70 80 78
12 6 18 16 18 15 24 6 8
Unclassified (17)
13 75 77 78 72 74 75 76 75
14 18 16 22 26 14 18 8 8
Composite Indexes (3)
15L 86 72 100 80 77 0 90 75
16C 100 86 100 80 77 20 90 83
17Lg 92 86 100 80 73 0 90 78
B. CLASSIFIED BY ECONOMIC PROCESS (l08)
I. Employment and Unemployment (15)
18 84 85 81 80 71 83 81 81
19 9 9 16 0 13 18 10 5
II. Production and Income (10)
20 93 80 92 56 74 46 84 79
21 9 6 10 31 11 16 8 7
III. Consumption, Trade, Orders, and Deliveries (13)
22 75 72 71 71 81 63 70 73
23 22 15 21 18 7 18 10 9
IV. Fixed Capital Investment (18)
24 80 73 68 52 79 67 74 73
25 15 12 23 30 9 22 5 4
V. Inventories andInventory Investment (9)
26 77 64 71 50 77 64 77 70
27 15 17 38 11 9 17 5 6321 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
Table 11.1 Continued
Statistical Economic
Timing Conformity Smoothness Currency Adequacy Revisions Significance Total
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VI. Prices, Costs, and Profits (17)
28 76 61 72 40 73 75 75 69
29 17 15 14 32 9 22 5 6
VII. Money and Credit (26)
30 77 68 65 70 82 82 78 75
31 14 19 33 30 17 19 5 7
Source: U.S. Department ofCommerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis 1984, table 7, pp. 169-71.
Note: In each section, except Composite Indexes (lines 15-17), entries in the first line are means ofthe
scores of the individual series, and entries in the second line are the corresponding standard deviations.
Entries in lines 15-17 are the mean scores ofthe leading (L), coincident (C), and lagging (Lg) composite
indexes. Series are seasonally adjusted except for those that appear to contain no seasonal movement.
The number of series in each group is shown in parentheses.
(which is here typically coincident) but low on currency and revisions (the
data from GNP accounts are quarterly and subject to several and often large
alterations). The series relating to consumption and trade do worse on timing,
conformity, and smoothness but better on currency, statistical adequacy, and
revisions (lines 22-23). In sum, the dispersion across the different groups of
indicators is much greater for the average scores of the individual attributes
than for the average total scores. The standard deviations within the groups,
too, tend to be much larger for the component than for the overall scores.
The indicators included in the leading, coincident, and lagging indexes
were chosen from the best-scoring series in the respective timing categories.
Obviously, high consistency of procyclical or countercyclical behavior, that
is, high conformity or coherence (correlation with business cycles, allowing
for any systematic leads or lags), is a desirable characteristic of any index
component. Timing consistency is particularly important. In addition, prompt
availability of reasonably accurate data is an essential requirement for an in-
dex that is to be used in current business analysis and forecasting. This means
that the component series should be released frequently with short publication
lags. Thus, beginning with the 1975 list, the composite indexes of the U.S.
Department ofCommerce include monthly series only. 5
As implied by these observations, the components ofthe leading index per-
5. Dropping GNP from the coincident index and corporate profits from the leading index in-
volved very difficult decisions in view ofthe importance ofthe represented variables. Real GNP
is, of course, the central measure of total output, but the data are quarterly and much revised.
Important studies ofbusiness cycles (notably Mitchell 1913, 1927) ascribe a major role to profits;
also, there is evidence of a strong tendency for total corporate profits to lead. But few concepts
are more difficult to measure than profits in the true economic sense. Data on corporate profits are
compiled only on a quarterly basis and are available only with long delays and sequences of
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form better than the average leading series on timing, conformity, and, partic-
ularly, smoothness and currency. However, this is partly paid for by lower
scores on revisions and (to a lesser extent) statistical adequacy. Due to these
offsets, the overall advantage of the index component series is modest (cf.
lines 1 and 3). Similar statements can be made about the coincident and lag-
ging series (cf. lines 5 and 7, and 9 and 11). Note that larger differences would
be shown had the index components been excluded from the "all series"
groups.
The indexes themselves score as well or better than the averages of the
corresponding component series in all categories except revisions. The gains
from combining the indicators are considerable for timing, conformity, and
currency but much larger yet for smoothness, especially in the case of the
leading indicators. However, until very recently, the indexes earned zero or
very low scores for revisions, mainly because each of them contained some
series that were not available in time to be included in the first release. No
estimates of the contributions of the missing components were made, so that
a month later, when the lagging data first appeared, the indexes typically
showed large revisions. Hence, the advantages elsewhere were again largely
dissipated here (cf. lines 3 and 15, 7 and 16, and 11 and 17). The two tardy
components were eliminated from the Department of Commerce leading in-
dex in 1989 with the intention of radically reducing the size of the revisions
in that index (Hertzberg and Beckman 1989; for detail, see table 11.3 and text
below).
Clearly, more is required of a good index than of a good single indicator.
For reasons already stated, the indexes should be reasonably diversified in
their economic coverage in order to have the potential to function well in the
longer run or under widely varying conditions. Also, each different variable
ofinterest should be given the best and broadest representation possible. Con-
sequently, the selection of index components favored comprehensive series
drawn from all major economic process groups that fit into the given timing
pattern. At times, the implementation ofthis principle involved some costs in
terms oflower scores than would be available otherwise (i.e., from collections
ofseries less diversified and/or less aggregative).
The existing indexes are designed to lead (or coincide or lag) at both peaks
and troughs ofbusiness cycles. This is restrictive since it excludes series with
mixed timing patterns, which prevail in some areas for reasons that are well
understood (see chapter 10, sec. 6). Such series (i.e., those that lead at peaks
and lag at troughs or vice versa) are included in the "unclassified" group in
table 11.1 (lines 13-14). Note that these indicators score on average about as
well as the other groups.
Recall also that in recent business cycles leads have been much more com-
mon, but also much more variable, at peaks than at troughs. As shown in table
11.2, the timing scores averaged considerably less at peaks than at troughs for
most indicators. Of the timing groups, only the laggers score slightly higherSource: See table 11. 1.
aAbbreviations: L = leading; I = index; C = roughly coincident; Lg = lagging.
bGroups are identified by roman numerals as in table 11 .1. See table 11.1 for the titles ofthese economic
process groups.
at peaks than at troughs, and ofthe economic process groups only the money
and credit series (VII) do so. However, the timing performance is much better
and more balanced between peaks and troughs for the composite indexes than
for the corresponding "all series" groups.
11.1.4 Measurement Errors
Macroeconomic indicators are obtained by processing and aggregating pri-
mary data that as a rule contain a variety oferrors, both random and system-
atic.6 The errors in the components may either offset or reinforce each other
in the aggregate. The procedures for the derivation of economic macromea-
sures can themselves contribute to the inaccuracy ofthe resulting time series.
The more complex the process and the more numerous the estimations and
approximations that are involved, the greater are the chances of substantial
defects, with conceptual, procedural, and statistical ingredients that are diffi-
cult to isolate and assess.
As shown by the pervasiveness and persistence of revisions in economic
statistics, some ofthe errors are ofthe kind that can be reduced only partially
6. Systematic errors may arise from nonprobability sampling or inadequate sampling or faulty
enumeration. Respondents and/or collectors of the data may be poorly informed or poorly moti-
vated or both. Concealment and falsification are possible. In short, the data vary greatly in cover-
age and quality, depending on the knowledge and cooperation ofthe people who make them. For
further discussion ofthese and other matters covered in this section ofthe text and the next one,
see Zamowitz 1982c.324 Chapter Eleven
and gradually. To be prompt and frequent, as demanded for current business
analysis and forecasting, information on important indicators must often take
the form of preliminary figures subject to repeated and possibly large altera-
tions. The discrepancies between the successive releases ofa time series rep-
resent for the most part errors resulting from large lags in the availability of
primary data. Although other errors created by conceptual and procedural
problems may well be more serious, they tend to be less identifiable. Their
detection and correction occurs only sporadically, as a result of benchmark
revisions and definitional changes that cause "breaks," that is, discontinuities
in several ofthe major indicator series.
Some ofthe cyclical indicators included in the BEA indexes have only oc-
casional and mostly minor revisions (average workweek, layoff rate, unem-
ployment duration) or no revisions at all (stock prices, vendor performance,
the prime rate). However, for most ofthe index components the first prelimi-
nary figure A I (issued in the current month for the previous one) is revised 1-
4 times in as many successive months (Ai' i = 2, 3, 4). The first two changes
generally account for a very high proportion ofthe total revision. 7
Let the error term in successive revisions be defined as Eit = A it - Alt. For
most indicators, both the averages taken without regard to sign and the stan-
dard deviations of E it tend to increase with i, the index of the time distance
between the revisions. The mean errors are predominantly negative, suggest-
ing underestimation of levels in the early data, but they are mostly small and
independent of i. Tests that Q i=0 and bi = 1 in the regression equations A it=
Q i+ bi A It+ eit produce mixed results. Although for most indicators the F-
and t-ratios are not clearly significant, they are so for some series that are
based on indirect estimation and, in their early version, seriously incomplete
data. The measurement errors revealed by the revisions are not systematically
larger in the leading than in the coincident orlagging indicators. The revisions
are typically fewer and less diffused over time in the monthly indicators than
in quarterly aggregates from the national income and product accounts.8 How-
ever, very large and frequent revisions are found in both sets oftime series for
such important variables as inflation, monetary changes, inventory invest-
ment, and profits.9 Adjustments for price changes and other procedures that
are inevitably intricate and approximate in nature tend to add to the probable
error.
For the composite indexes of cyclical indicators, incomplete coverage in
7. For quantitative evidence, see Zamowitz 1982c, pp. 93-103. This and the following para-
graph present in briefthe main qualitative findings from this study.
8. The GNP revisions extend from those in each ofthe three months following the quarter to
which the data refer, through those in July ofeach ofthe three successive years, to the large but
infrequent benchmark overhauls that are important in the historical sense rather than for any prac-
tical current purposes. See Zellner 1958; R. Cole 1969b.
9. In recent times, series for various monetary aggregates have been published at monthly and
weekly intervals and revised almost as frequently (see, e.g., Pierce et al. 1981). On the impor-
tance ofrevisions in the GNP implicit price deflator, see Keane and Runkle 1990, pp. 722-24. On
measures ofinventory investment and corporate profits, see Zamowitz 1982c, pp. 95-96.325 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
the early releases has long presented a major practical problem. In the absence
of good and timely estimates for the missing components, this problem is a
particularly serious one for series to be used in forecasting such as the leading
indexes. Further difficulties in the application and testing ofthese series arise
from occasional discontinuities due to changes in the composition, weights,
or other technical aspects of the indexes. (About all ofthis more will be said
later in this chapter.)
Measurement errors are very common in economic data and they affect eco-
nomic behavior, analysis, and forecasting; yet their role is not well under-
stood. For example, consider tests ofthe predictive value ofthe leading index
(l) based on forecasts ofreal GNP (q) obtained from lagged values ofq and l.
Should I be represented by preliminary values because these alone are avail-
able to an authentic ex ante forecaster? And should q be represented by final
values because these alone represent the "truth" to be predicted? To answer
yes to both questions implies that the forecasts are expected to eliminate cor-
rectly the cumulative future errors in the series on real GNP growth (as re-
vealed by the whole string of statistical and conceptual revisions). But these
errors may be both highly significant and to a large extent unforecastable.
Moreover, the lagged values of q in their final form are unknown to the real-
time forecaster. In sum, tests of this type could be severely biased against
finding l a good predictor ofq because the measures used leave large errors in
l but not in q. 10
Testing forecasts against revised instead ofinitial values ofthe target series
may result in a spurious rejection of the hypothesis that the forecasts are ra-
tional or unbiased (cf. Keane and Runkle 1990). However, the errors in the
predicted variable can have different consequences, depending entirely on
their nature. If the errors are small and random, they will matter little or not
at all. If they are significant and systematic but largely predictable, they
should optimally be taken into account by the forecaster (see chapter 13).
On the assumption that the revisions, as intended, cumulatively improve
the data, 11 they provide important information: the larger, the less stable, and
the more stretched out in time they are, the less dependable are the most recent
statistics relating to the current economic situation. For series that are not
revised, this information is simply lacking: they mayor may not have signifi-
cant measurement errors. The absence ofrevisions, or the cessation offurther
revisions, does not prove the absence oferrors.
Measures ofstatistical adequacy help assess the quality ofa time series but
offer no substitute for the quantitative estimates of error available from the
revisions. For 110 BCD indicators as of 1975-80, scores for these character-
10. Diebold and Rudebusch 1990b follow a method analogous to that described in the text
paragraph above, but their target variable is industrial production, which is not as strongly affected
by errors that can be inferred from data revisions as real GNP is. See section 11.3.4 below.
11. This is not always true: it is not unusual to find some revisions, in a chain ofseveral, which
increase, rather than reduce, the discrepancy between the prior and the final estimate.326 Chapter Eleven
istics averaged 70 (out of 100), fell heavily in the 60-79 range, and were not
systematically differentiated by broad categories ofeconomic process and cy-
clical timing. 12
11.1.5 Information Lags
Fourteen of our cyclical indicators are weekly or daily series that can be
smoothed with a minimum loss of timeliness and provide monthly estimates
the same month or early in the next month; 67 are monthly series available
with lags of 1 month (48), 2 months (15), and 3 month (4); and 29 are quar-
terly series available some time during the next quarter. The currency scores
are 100 for a series that is collected at least weekly, 20 for a quarterly series,
and intermediate for monthly series-the lower the score, the longer the lag
ofrelease.
Even if a series is available promptly, its month-to-month movement may
be so obscured by either seasonal change or irregular variation (noise) as to
shed little light on the longer, cyclical movements and trends that are of pri-
mary interest for current business analysis and forecasting. To the extent that
the seasonal fluctuations are distinct, independent, and stable, they can be
reasonably well measured and eliminated (most indicators are presently re-
ported in seasonally adjusted form). The noise element varies greatly across
the indicators, as shown by measures computed for each ofthem in the Bureau
of the Census X-II program ofdecomposition and seasonal adjustment. The
ratio l/c; compares the irregular to the trend-cycle component of the given
series, the average changes in the two being measured over i unit periods. As
the span i is increased, C; builds up while I; shows little (and no systematic)
change, so the ratio generally declines. The shortest span i, in months, for
whichllc < 1is called MCD (months for cyclical dominance). The smoother
a series, the smaller are its llc and MCD values. In a set of 81 weekly and
monthly indicators, 30 series had MCD = 1, 21 series had MCD = 2, and 30
series had MCD~3 (37%, 26%, and 37%, respectively). For 29 quarterly
indicators, the corresponding frequencies were 4 (14%), 13 (45%), and 12
(41%).
A cross-classification of the series by scores for currency and smoothness
shows no tendency for the two ordinal scales to either agree or disagree with
each other systematically (see Zamowitz 1982c, table 4 and pp. 108-10). The
coefficient ofrank association is here G = .07, and the probability ofthe true
value ofG being different from 0 seems extremely low (Goodman and Kruskal
1954, 1963). Across the series, then, our measures of the data-release lag
(currency) and the signal-detection lag (smoothness) are uncorrelated. By
adding these lags for each series, one can obtain a rough estimate ofthe total
lag involved in extracting information from the data.
12. See Zamowitz 1982c, text and table 3, pp. 103 and 106-8. The series show more dispersion
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Table 11.3 Estimated Information Lags for 110 Cyclical Indicator Series
Information Weekly or
Lag (months) Monthly (no.) Quarterly (no.) All (no.) All (0/0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2 22 0 22 20.0
3 25 0 25 22.7
4 18 4 22 20.0
5 6 13 19 17.3
6 3 11 14 12.7
7 4 1 5 4.6
8 1 0 1 0.9
9 2 0 2 1.8
Total 81 29 110 100.0
Average lag (months) 3.6 5.3 4.1
Source: Zamowitz 1982c, text and table 4.
Note: The information lag is the sum ofthe data-release lag (1-3 months) and the signal-detection
lag (1-6 months). The information lags of2-4 months consist ofdata-release lags of 1-2 months
and signal-detection lags of 1-3 months; the longer information lags include data-release lags of
3 months and signal-detection lags of4-6 months.
Table 11.3 shows that the lags so calculated vary from 2 to 9 months for the
weekly and monthly indicators and from 4 to 7 months for the quarterly indi-
cators. The 41 series (37% ofthe sample) that have lags of5 or more months
account for about halfofthe sensitive indicators offixed and inventory invest-
ment, prices, costs, profits, money, and credit. The estimates are conservative
in the sense that they ignore whatever could be done to shorten the informa-
tion lags by skillful data analysis (e.g., use of weekly and monthly data to
correct deficit oranticipate tardy monthly and quarterly information) and fore-
casting (e.g., projections of lead-lag relationships). On the other hand, they
are understated because the signal-detection lags are derived from revised ob-
servations rather than current figures, which are frequently preliminary and
contain more statistical noise. On average, the underestimation is probably 1
or 1.5 months for all the series covered but higher, perhaps 1-3 months, for
those series with significant revisions. 13
Incomplete or defective information can contribute to expectation and de-
cision errors. Furthermore, the longer and more staggered the information
lags, the longer will such errors persist and the costlier will be their effects,
detection, and correction. The actual lags and errors are unlikely to be a major
source ofbusiness cycles but can surely playa significant role in their propa-
gation (see chapter 2, sees. 2.4.3 and 2.4.5).
13. These are rough estimates, based on simple methods applicable to large volumes ofdata at
relatively low costs, but they yield generally plausible results. They are, to my knowledge, not
contradicted by other studies that use different techniques posing higher data requirements (for
further detail and references, see Zamowitz 1982c, pp. 111-12).328 Chapter Eleven
Informational lags and errors impede learning and prediction, yet to coun-
teract them, longer and better forecasts are required. An effective reduction of
the time needed to assess the state of the economy in the present and near
future is itself a modest but significant forecasting achievement. The leading
and confirming indexes can help the forecaster advance further along this way.
11.2 The Composition, Timing Records, and Construction of
Composite Indexes
11.2.1 The Present Indexes
The currently published indexes of leading, coincident, and lagging indi-
cators incorporate revisions that the Commerce Department (BEA) introduced
in February 1989. Table 11.4 presents a summary of the timing records of
these indexes and their components. The measures refer to the seven peaks
and seven troughs ofbusiness cycles in 1953-82.
The leading index consists now of 11 series drawn from five economic pro-
cess groups (it includes no series on production or income and none related to
inventories). Three cyclically sensitive and important variables that were rep-
resented in the past are no longer: corporate profit, the flow of credit, and
inventory investment. This is regrettable and presumably due to the deficien-
cies of the data, which one greatly wishes were remedied. The inclusion of
quarterly or tardy monthly series would necessitate either releasing the index
y.'ith long delays, using some monthly proxies first, or adding the data for
these variables only after the initial estimate of the index had been published
(at the cost of large index revisions). None of the alternatives are appealing.
As a result, the index is somewhat less broadly based than some ofits prede-
cessors (see table 11.5 and text below). On the other hand, the new index has
the advantage that all of its components are promptly available and subject to
smaller revisions than the excluded series. This should make the successive
estimates ofthe index for any month less variable and therefore easier to inter-
pret with some confidence.
Two ofthe leading series on the 1989 list (BCD code numbers 1 and 5) are
early indicators of labor market developments; three (8, 20, 92) are built
wholly or partly from data on new and unfilled orders received by manufac-
turers; two (19, 99) are indexes of cyclically sensitive prices of assets (com-
mon stocks) and inputs (industrial materials); and 1each represent residential
investment commitments (29), the speed ofdeliveries (32), consumer expec-
tations (83), and the deflated money stock (106). Except for the newly added
index ofconsumer expectations, all these indicators stand for variables that in
one form or another were given some attention in earlier vintages ofthe lead-
ing index as well. The coverage still relies heavily on manufacturing, con-
struction, and selected market and trade data. Efforts to find and add leading
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cess (the change in the consumer price index for services is included in the
new composite index oflagging indicators). The available time series in these
areas are generally dominated by longer trends and not very cyclical.
Only the future can reveal the predictive potential and usefulness in appli-
cation ofthe new indexes and their components, but it is somewhat reassuring
to know that at least in the past the cyclical timing of the selected series has
been fairly consistent. For the 11 leading indicators, the rh-ean (median) leads
at peaks had a range of 7-16 (8-15) months. The standard deviations varied
from about 3 to 13 and were smaller than the corresponding means in each
case except one (index ofconsumer expectations). At troughs, the leads were
much shorter, averaging 1 month or less for four ofthe series and 2-5 months
for the others. Here the dispersion (S.D.) measures show the same order of
magnitude as the means. In other words, the leaders at peaks often had only
very short leads or a more nearly coincident timing at troughs (compare cols.
1-3 and 4-6 in the first section oftable 11.4). The means (S.D.) ofthe leads
of the composite index itself were approximately 10 (6) and 5 (4) months at
business cycle peaks and troughs, respectively (the median lead at troughs
was only 2 months).
It will be recalled that the peak-trough differences in timing extend to a
great many cyclical indicators (chapter 10). Whereas the leads tend to be
much longer at peaks than at troughs ofthe postwar business cycles, the lags
tend to be longer at troughs than at peaks. Indeed, the latter shows up as a
clear contrast for the present lagging index of the Commerce Department
(BEA) and for each of its seven components (see the last section in table
11.4). In short, the observations for the principal indicators and indexes re-
flect a more broadly observed phenomenon.
The timing differences are very likely related to the asymmetries ofpostwar
business cycles. We are already familiar with the relevant facts: expansions
have typically been much longer and more gradual than contractions. Long-
term growth accounts for a part but not all of the apparently strong asymme-
tries (see chapter 8, sec. 8.3.4). The results of the indicator analysis suggest
that separate leading indexes for peaks and troughs could have some signifi-
cant advantages. In 1975, experimental indexes ofthis type were constructed
with partially positive results (see Zarnowitz and Boschan 1975a, n. 23).
They met with the criticism of being too complicated and costly to maintain
and use, but recently a very different analysis gave independent support to the
same idea (Diebold and Rudebusch 1989).14
None ofthe three composite indexes failed to match any ofthe recorded 14
business cycle turns of 1953-82, and the same is true of 17 of their compo-
nent series (table 11.4, col. 7). The series real M2 missed 6 turns, 1 lagging
series missed 4, and 3 series (one in each timing category) missed 2 turns, or
14. "[T]he use oftwo indexes, an 'expansion index' and a 'contraction index,' constructed with
different components and component weights, could enhance predictive performance" (Diebold
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 phase, each. Earlier indexes had similarly good records in the sense ofhav-
ing missed very few business cycle turns. Of course, it helps that this is a
retrospective analysis using currently available, revised data; spotting the
turns ex ante in preliminary data is at times much more difficult. Even so,
missing the turning points ofbusiness cycles is definitely not the most impor-
tant type oferror for these indicators; giving false signals is.
This is readily seen from the contrast between the rare instances ofbusiness
cycle turns missed and the high frequencies of extra specific-cycle turns
missed (cf. cols. 7 and 8). Each ofthe leading series had some cyclical move-
ments of its own that were not correlated with the general economic fluctua-
tions. The modal number of extra turns was 4, some series had 2 and 6, but
one (the stock price index) had 10. Interestingly, a very similar statement can
be made about the lagging indicators, except that one of these had no extra
turns (one, the index ofunit labor cost, had 10).
As would be expected, the four comprehensive coincident indicators show
a record of almost one-to-one correspondence with business cycle peaks and
troughs, that is, a minimal number oferrors ofeither type. About one third of
the individual comparisons at peaks and half of those at troughs were exact
coincidences (0), with the rest divided between mostly short leads and lags.
Employment was slightly lagging.
The coincident index itself led at three peaks, lagged at two troughs, and
had the timing 0 at each of the other nine business cycle turns. The ratio of
this index to the lagging index (which reflects inversely the role of costs of
labor, inventory, and finance; see chapter 10) tended to lead, by long intervals
at peaks and short ones at troughs.
11.2.2 Five Successive Lists ofLeading Indicators, 1950-89
The first list of NBER business cycle indicators was based on a study of
nearly 500 series that varied in length but ended in 1933 (Mitchell and Bums
1938). It included 71 series "tolerably consistent in their timing in relation to
business cycle revivals" and a subset of 21 "most trustworthy" of these indi-
cators. The next review used about 800 series through 1938, classified them
by timing, and selected indicators of recession as well as revival (Moore
1950). After another decade, it was possible to analyze still more series and
extend the measures through 1958 (Moore 1961). Revised short and supple-
mentary lists of indicators were shown, along with the first composite index
of leading indicators. In 1966 another study introduced an explicit scoring
plan and used it to evaluate more than a hundred series (Moore and Shiskin
1967). The results included new long and short lists ofU.S. indicators classi-
fied by cyclical timing and economic process, and corresponding composite
indexes.
In 1972-75, the BEA conducted a comprehensive appraisal of cyclical in-
dicators and indexes with the cooperation ofmembers ofthe NBER staff (Zar-
nowitz and Boschan 1975a and 1975b). Between 1967 and 1975 inflation in-333 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
tensified and two recessions occurred (1970 and 1973-75). Some of the old
nominal indicators needed to be deflated to perform well under the new con-
ditions; other revisions became advisable for other reasons, including as usual
changes in the available data. The last, rather limited review ofthe indicators
was completed by the BEA staff in 1989.
Table 11.5 presents the complete record ofall the revisions in the short lists
of the leading indicators for both revivals and recessions from 1950 through
1989. These are also the lists of the components of the successive composite
leading indexes since 1960. The numerous footnotes cite the reasons for each
of the changes made, as given at the time. They also cover any interim revi-
sions made between the five dates when the new lists were published. Because
the table provides detailed references and documentation, the text to follow is
limited to a few general explanations.
A quick glance at table 11.5 seems likely to give the impression of great
variability, as if almost all selections were transitory and the composition of
the lists or indexes was quite unstable over time. But this would be very mis-
leading. A closer look shows that each list retained several series from the
previous one and that most of the changes were substitutions or additions
within the same economic process groups (see Summary at the end of the
table). In other words, most of the revisions replaced some series with other
representations of similar variables. Often the reason was the availability of
new data deemed conceptually or statistically superior or the discontinuation
of old data. Some changes, as noted earlier, w~re dictated by considerations
oftimeliness; others, by unpredictable events in government or business (see,
e.g., nn. d and k; the latter had partly to do with the lack ofgood current data
on new business telephones after the breakup ofAT&T in 1982). To be sure,
at times errors were made and reversed when recognized (see nn. e and cc).
To the extent that revisions take time but improve the data, there is inevi-
tably a conflict between the promptness and accuracy of estimates and fore-
casts. But the presumption that the more recent indexes are better does not
mean that the earlier ones have failed. On the contrary, as shown in chapter
10, sec. 10.7, the 1950 indexes, though based on pre-1938 data, would have
performed reasonably well in terms of timing at the business cycle turns of
1948-75.
11.2.3 Index Construction Methods and Revisions
There are six basic steps in the calculation of a composite index in the
traditional NBER-BEA style. (1) Month-to-month percentage changes are
computed for each component series expressed originally as levels. 15 Series
expressed as changes are differenced. (2) For each series, the changes ob-
tained in step 1 are divided by their long-run average without regard to sign.
15. Formulas ensuring symmetrical treatment ofpositive and negative changes are used. For a
more detailed narrative and algebraic explanation of the methodology, see U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis 1984, pp. 65-69.335 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
Table 11.5 Continued
Indicator Lists of
Group & Number of Economic Processa;
Title, Source, & No. of Seriesb 1950 1960 1966 1975 1989
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sensitive Commodity Prices (VI)
Wholesale price index, 28 basic commo- x
dities
t
Industrial materials price index
u x x
Percentage change, WPI ofcrude materi- x
als, excluding foods & feeds,
smoothed (1,3; 99)"
Percentage change in a revised index of x
sensitive materials prices (1, 3; 99)
Stock Prices (VI)
Dow-Jones index, industrial stock prices"' x
S&P stock price index, 500 common x x X x
stocks (19)x
Profits and Profit Margins (VI)
Corporate profits after taxes, current X x
dollars, Q (1; 16)·'·
Ratio, price to unit labor cost, manufac- x
turing (1, 3; 26)z
Credit Difficulties (VII)
Current liabilities of business x x
failures (14)aa
Credit Flows (III)
Net change in consumer installment x
credit (4; 113)bb
Money (VII)
Money supply, M1, in constant dollars x
(1,4; 105Yc
Money supply, M2, in constant dollars x
(1,4; I06Yc
Percentage change in total liquid assets, x
smoothed (I, 4; 104)dd
Summary Number of'
Component series in each list 8 12 12 12 II
Series unchanged from previous list n.a.t't' 4 5 4 7
Substitutions within same group n.a. 4 4 5 2
Additions within same group n.a. 2 2 1 2
Additions in new group n.a. 2 1 2 ° Deletions from previous list 4 3 3 2
Sources: Moore 1950, 1961; Moore and Shiskin 1967; Zarnowitz and Boschan 1975a; Hertzberg and
Beckman 1989. See text for more detail.
aRoman numerals denote economic processes. See table 11. 1 for the titles.
bThe first number in parentheses following the title of the series denotes the source as follows: 1. U.S.
Department ofCommerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analysis; 2. U.S. Department ofCommerce, Bureau of
the Census; 3. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; 4. Board of Governors of the
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Table 11.5 Continued
Federal Reserve System. The second number in parentheses identifies the series in the BCD and the
Survey ofCurrent Business (SCB). The numbers are given only for the series carried most recently in
the BCD or currently in the SCB. For the corresponding information on the other series, see footnotes
below.
cSource 3; old BCD series no. 2. Replaced in 1966 by nonagricultural placements (source 3; old BCD
series no. 4), which "provide broader coverage and prompter availability" (Moore and Shiskin 1967, p.
69; henceforth M-S). Discontinued in February 1982.
dReplaced in September 1969 by average weekly initial claims for state unemployment insurance (see
note e below). Stated reason: Shift in emphasis of the public offices of the U.S. Department of Labor
from total placements to services for disadvantaged workers. These services take more staff time than is
required for qualified workers. The effect of this policy change has been to slow down the number of
placements. Data not updated since June 1970, discontinued July 1971 (see BCD, September 1969 and
July 1971, p. III).
eSource 3; old BCD series no. 3. Omitted in 1966 because "workweek and placements enough for short
list" (M-S). Reinstated to replace average weekly initial claims in 1975 because "layoff rate leads more
consistently at troughs" (Zamowitz and Boschan 1975a, p. 6; henceforth Z-B). Discontinued in February
1982 and replaced again with average weekly initial claims.
fReplaced in 1975 by a series ofreal new orders received by manufacturing industries producing primar-
ily consumer goods and materials. This allows separation of these orders from orders for equipment,
which are aggregated with contracts for plant (see note below). Deflation needed for better cyclical
performance since the late 1960s because ofpersistent rise in the general price level (Z-B).
gIncludes the on-order portion of the series net change in inventories on hand and on order in constant
dollars, which was dropped from the leading index in 1989 because the current data for the on-hand
portion are not available in time to be included in the initial estimate of the index. Covers all durable
goods, including also capital goods and defense products. (See Hertzberg and Beckman 1989, pp. 97-
98; henceforth H-B).
hBased on surveys by Purchasing Management ofChicago and, since 1989, by the National Association
of Purchasing Management. "Best available indicator ofchanges in delivery lags" (Z-B).
iCompiled by the University ofMichigan's Survey Research Center. "Added to provide a new dimension
to the leading index" (H-B).
iSource: Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce. Quarterly. Replaced the
monthly Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., series on new incorporations in 1960 because the latter "is occasion-
ally affected strongly by changes in legislation, especially in the tax laws, ... and partly because the
net changes take account ofdiscontinuances" (Moore 1961, p. 66; henceforth M6l). Discontinued after
1959:4 and replaced by the monthly index of net business formation. For references and comparisons,
see M61, ch. 14).
kOriginal sources: Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., and Bureau of the Census. Suspended from the index in
March 1987. This series "deteriorated as a measure ofchange in business population, primarily because
of the poor quality of one component of the series and the unavailability of data of another component
in the time for inclusion in the initial release" (see BCD, February 1987, p. III).
ISource: McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company. Replaced in 1966 by contracts and orders for
plant and equipment (see note m below) because of"poor timing and conformity record since 1950. The
equivalent value series, plus privately owned public utilities, is included in the series on contracts and
orders" (M-S).
m"Most comprehensive series on new investment commitments by business enterprises"; new since 1960
list (M-S).
n"Deflation is needed for better cyclical performance since the late 1960's" (Z-B).
°Source: F. W. Dodge Corp. Replaced by housing starts in 1960 because starts are "less erratic... and
currently published more promptly" (M61, p. 65).
pCompared with housing starts, "permits series is smoother" (M-S).
qYolatile but persistently leading, especially at peaks, since 1939 (M61, pp. 68-69).
'Replaced the quarterly inventory investment in 1966 because "monthly series more current" (M-S).
s"Concept of including stocks on order is better. Deflation is needed for better cyclical performance"
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Table 11.5 Continued
'Source: BLS. Unweighted geometric mean of relatives for 28 products.
IISource: BLS. Includes daily prices of 13 raw or simply processed materials. Conformed more closely
to business cycles than the broader index, which includes prices of foodstuffs "subject to vagaries of
weather conditions and government farm price policies" (M61, p. 69).
""Percent change is better than level. Leads are more consistent, especially since the late 1960's (Z-B).
Revised in 1989 to improve the methodology and date consistency (H-B).
"Source: Dow-Jones & Co., Inc. Unweighted mean of prices of 30 industrial stocks.
{Source: Standard & Poor's Corp. New monthly index of prices of 500 common stocks introduced in
1957; before then coverage smaller but increasing (from 198 stocks in 1918 to 480 in 1957). The S&P
index has the advantage ofgreater coverage and diversification compared with the Dow-Jones index.
'Dropped from the index in 1975 because ofbeing "quarterly and tardy (low score for currency)" (Z-B).
=Old BCD series no. 17. Ratio of price to unit cost, manufacturing, dropped from the index in 1975
because it "failed to lead at the last three business cycle troughs (1958-70)" (Z-B).
aaSource: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Dropped from the index in 1966 because of"poor timing and conform-
ity record since 1948" (M-S).
bbIncluded in the index in 1966 because of "wide cyclical movements and consistent leads" (M-S).
Dropped from the index in 1975 with the comment that it "lacks timeliness. In recent period, very erratic
and more nearly coincident than leading at troughs" (Z-B).
ccDeflated by the consumer price index. Included in the index in 1975 as an "important measure of the
quantity ofmoney in real terms. Good scores for indicator performance" (Z-B). Replaced in March 1979
by M2 money supply deflated by the CPI. The more comprehensive monetary aggregate was favored by
changes due to deregulation of banking, new interest-earning and highly liquid types of deposits, and
greater incentives to economize on the use of money.
ddIncluded in the index in 1975 as a "comprehensive measure of changes in wealth held in liquid form
by private nonfinancial investors" (Z-B). Replaced in February 1983 by change in business and consumer
credit outstanding (1, 4; Ill), which had a better record of cyclical conformity and timing in recent
years. The credit change series was dropped from the index in January 1989.
('en.a. = not applicable.
This standardization makes the mean absolute value for each so-transformed
series equal to 1, and it prevents the more volatile series from dominating the
index. (3) For each month, the values of all available component series ob-
tained in step 2 are averaged. 16 (4) The resulting changes are then adjusted for
the leading (L) and lagging (Lg) indexes so that their long-run absolute aver-
ages are equal to that of the coincident index (C). This index standardization
procedure (division by the ratio of long-run averages L/C and Lg/C, respec-
tively) has the purpose offacilitating the use ofthe three indexes as a consist-
ent system. (5) The so-modified average changes are cumulated into a "raw"
index for each of the three sets of indicators. (6) A common trend is estab-
lished for the three indexes, which can be viewed as a linear approximation to
the secular movement in aggregate economic activity. 17 The trend adjustment
16. Before the last BEA revision (i.e., through January 1989) the average was a weighted one,
with the total scores ofthe series serving as weights. Since then, in the computation ofthe revised
indexes, the components ofeach index are assigned equal weights. The change had relatively little
effect because the weights based on the scores of the series were not very different from 1 (see
Hertzberg and Beckman 1989, p. 99).
17. Before 1989 the target trend was the average of the long trends in the four components of
the coincident index (0.268% per month). For the latest revised indexes, the trend is that ofreal
GNP (0.261% permonth). Clearly, the two trends are almost the same, so the effect ofthis change
was minimal (Hertzberg and Beckman 1989, p. 100).338 Chapter Eleven
enhances the usefulness of the indexes by making them differ only with re-
spect to short-term, mainly cyclical movements.
In three decades ofdevelopment, the composite indexes ofleading, coinci-
dent, and lagging indicators spread to many countries, aided by and promot-
ing the growth ofinformation about national and international economic fluc-
tuations (Klein and Moore 1985; Moore and Moore 1985). Following Mintz
1969, methods ofcombining series in terms ofdeviations from trend or rates
ofgrowth were devised to track growth cycles, which have become more com-
mon than business cycles. These methods share the several basic elements of
index construction listed above, but they adapt them depending on the treat-
ment oftrends and weighting and differ in many technical details. Interesting
work on composite index construction has been done in Australia (Haywood
1973) and by the British Central Statistical Office (CSO 1976), Statistics Can-
ada (Rhoades 1982), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD 1987), and Japan's Economic Planning Agency (EPA, since
the early 1970s). A useful comparison of these methods is provided in Bos-
chan and Banerji 1990, where a procedure is suggested that uses the standard
deviation ofsmoothed, detrended series as the standardization factor. The am-
plitude standardization is at the core ofthe construction ofthese indexes. It is
itself a form of weighting that equalizes the volatility of the index compo-
nents. Scoring is useful in choosing the component series but weighting based
on the scores mayor may not be helpful (it could be redundant). Transforma-
tions of the individual series are needed to induce stationarity as appropriate
in each particular case.
The U.S. composite indexes are updated near the end of each month by
computing the preliminary figures for the previous month and recomputing a
number ofpreceding values. 18 From time to time, recomputations are made to
incorporate longer term, benchmark and seasonal revisions. In addition, the
standardization factors for the components and the indexes, and the trend ad-
justment factors, are updated at longer intervals. 19
These statistical revisions, as well as the definitional revisions (composi-
tional and weight changes), make it necessary to differentiate clearly between
the uses of preliminary estimates and the revised index data. Evaluations of
the latter have their role in historical and analytical contexts, but authentic ex
ante or real-time forecasting always involves preliminary values. Diebold and
Rudebusch (1987) examined the stochastic properties ofthe first-released data
and subsequent revisions for the Department of Commerce index of leading
indicators. They report that in 1983-87 the revisions (particularly the earliest
ones, which contained the most information) behaved approximately as if
they were errors ofefficient forecasts. This was not the case in 1979-81, when
measurement errors due to the missing index components were much more
severe.
18. For 11 months before 1987 and for 5 months in the latest revised indexes.
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11.3 Forecasting with Leading Indicators
11.3.1 Some General Observations
By their own testimony, practicing forecasters use leading indicators
widely, along with other methods and information. In predicting the course of
the economy in the near future, business economists generally rely on "acom-
plicated combination of quantitative and qualitative elements-with a heavy
emphasis placed upon the exercise of judgment" (Butler, Kavesh, and Platt
1974, p. 207). The major expenditure components of GNP are forecast with
the aid of theory, statistical procedures such as regression, and assumptions
about policy and other external changes. The GNP accounting framework and
checks and adjustments for consistency and plausibility are then used to de-
rive the overall forecasts. As documented in chapter 13 (sec. 13.8), evidence
from surveys shows that most professional analysts of the short-term eco-
nomic outlook favor this flexible and eclectic approach, labeled the "informal
GNP model." When asked to rank items on a short list ofgeneral forecasting
techniques according to their own usage, most respondents chose the informal
GNP model as first. But very few replies referred only to this or any other
single method; combinations prevail heavily. Many ofthe surveyed forecasters
reported using leading indicators and outside macroeconometric models,
which were given predorninantly second or third ranks. (Of course, some
forecasters work primarily with their own full-scale econometric models, but
their number is relatively small.) Anticipations surveys and "other methods"
(such as time-series analysis) received fewer references and were cast mostly
in subsidiary roles.
The methods are broadly defined and jointly applied so that it is hardly
possible to isolate and assess the contribution ofeach (more on this in chapter
13). The surveys provide no measures ofjust how well the leading and con-
firming indicators and indexes serve their users, although they affirm credibly
that these time series are in fact regularly and extensively employed as tools
for the analysis ofcurrent and forecasting offuture business conditions.
To test the predictive value ofthe leading indicators, it is necessary to spec-
ify the data (usually a leading index and/or its components); the target (all
changes in some representation ofaggregate economic activity; turning points
in business cycles or the selected aggregate); and the procedure or rule to be
applied (regressions ofcoincident on leading variables; filtering ofthe leading
series to forecast peaks and troughs). A double dichotomy has emerged in the
literature. (1) Some writers concentrate on the prediction of turning points,
arguing that this is the most appropriate or the most important function of
leading indicators, and that the economy behaves differently in the vicinity of
peaks and troughs ordifferently in expansions than in contractions. Others use
the leaders simply as linear predictors of all successive values of some mea-
sure of economic activity. (2) Most tests of either sort have been based on
revised data as of the time of the study, but some have tried to re-create the340 Chapter Eleven
actual, real-time forecasting situation by employing preliminary data avail-
able at the time ofthe forecast.
11.3.2 Tests ofTurning-Point Predictions
Several studies attempted to evaluate leading indicators and indexes as pre-
dictors of cyclical turns, that is, sustained changes of direction in aggregate
economic activity. Such appraisals require that a set of filtering rules be con-
sidered. Not each monthly wiggle in the leading index need be significant,
and excessive concern with a single month's movement must be severely dis-
couraged.
Vaccara and Zarnowitz (1978a, 1978b) considered two very simple rules.
(1) Let three consecutive monthly declines in the leading index (1975 version)
signal a downturn, and three consecutive rises, an upturn. This yielded mean
leads of 8.8 and 3.2 months at business cycle peaks and troughs in 1948-76,
no missed turns, and five "extra cycles." 20 Because 3 months must elapse
before a turning point is identified, a minimum lead of 4 months is required
for a sufficiently early warning. Leads at least this long did occur at all five
peaks covered but only at three ofthe six troughs. (2) As an alternative, treat
each directional change in the trailing 6-month moving average of the index
as a turning-point signal. This rule reduces the requisite effective lead time to
2 months. The mean leads are here 5.6 and 1.0 months at peaks and troughs,
respectively. Again, there are no missed turns and five false signals each of
peaks and troughs.
Earlier, Hymans (1973) applied the rule of two consecutive monthly de-
clines (rises) in expansion (contraction) to the leading index constructed in
1966. As might have been expected, this resulted in an unacceptably large
number of false predictions, particularly of peaks. The assumption that the
forecaster has timely knowledge of the current phase of the business cycle is
hardly justified in the critical periods around peaks and troughs. Hymans con-
structed an alternative index of leading indicators based on spectral analysis,
using the same components as the 1966 NBER index. This method combines
indicator components corresponding to four cyclical periodicities (of 60, 40,
30, and 24 months) and so filters out false signals much more effectively, but
at the cost ofstrongly reducing the size and frequency ofthe leads.
Filtering rules typically involve trade-offs of currency for accuracy: the
more smoothing, the fewer the extra turns but also the shorter the effective
lead time at true turns. This is so whether one requires longer runs (more
months of maintained direction of movement) or longer spans (more months
over which to measure the change). To· get better signals, the magnitude of
changes in the indicators should be taken into account as well as their direc-
tion.
20. Three extra cycles were associated with the growth cycle slowdowns in 1950-51, 1962,
and 1966. The other two involved declines that lasted only 3 months each.341 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
Combining selected leading series into indexes can greatly reduce the fre-
quency of false predictions of turning points but cannot eliminate the prob-
lem. The leading indexes issue warnings not only of recessions but also of
cyclical retardations, that is, phases when the overall real growth rates fall
below their long-term average but remain positive (except possibly for an oc-
casional brief slippage below 0). In sum, these indexes predict best the
"growth cycles" in trend-adjusted aggregates ofoutput and employment. This
was found to be true as well for Japan, Canada, and Western Europe (Moore
1983, chs. 5 and 6). What is needed, therefore, is a method that would allow
us to discriminate in a timely fashion between recessions and major slow-
downs and thereby safeguard against the main type of"extra turns" that occur
in practical forecasting.
To this purpose, a sequential signaling system has been devised and tested
with some promising results in Zarnowitz and Moore 1982. The long-term
trends built into both the leading and the coincident indexes are 3.3% per
annum, and the standard deviations oftheir random components are approxi-
mately 1.0%. Now consider smoothed 6-month percentage changes in these
indexes, calculated at compound annual rates from preliminary data available
at the time of forecast. 21 This yields two trendless series to be labeled the
"leading index rate" (L) and the "coincident index rate" (C). The procedure is
to monitor their movements on a current basis, paying special attention to two
percentage bands: 3.3 ± 1.0 and 0 ± 1.0. The first signal of a business
cycle peak (P1) occurs when the leading index rate falls below the upper band,
while the coincident index rate, which will typically be higher, remains non-
negative. In short, PI: L < 2.3, C~O. The second signal of a peak is ob-
served when the leading rate falls below the lower band and the coincident
rate falls below the upper band; that is, P2: L < - 1.0, C < 2.3. The third
and last signal (P3) is defined by L < 0, C < - 1.0; that is, the coincident
rate falls below the lower band, and the leading rate remains negative. A sig-
nal is invalidated when either index rate, after declining across a band, rises
again above it; it is not invalidated when L or C merely backs up into the band
and stays there.
Table 11.6 presents the record of these signals based on historical data for
the period through September 1976 and on preliminary data thereafter. The
four slowdowns not followed by recessions (in 1951, 1962, 1966, and 1984)
were all associated with prompt PI signals. In 1951, P2 followed PI by 4
months, adding to uncertainty, but in the other instances there were no further
warnings. The absence ofP2 should have ruled out a false prediction, and the
absence ofP3 a false identification, ofa business cycle peak. That the signals
would have been reasonably timely on most occasions is suggested by the
following overall timing means (standard deviations): PI led P2 by 5 (2)
21. This is done by dividing the current month's index by the average of the 12 preceding
months and raising the ratio to the 12/6.5 power (the center ofthe average is located 6.5 months
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months, P2led P3 by 5 (5) months, and growth cycle peaks led business cycle
peaks by 7 (4) months.
Sequences of all three signals occurred before each ofthe seven recessions
covered, and only at these times. 22 They were short and concentrated when
there was little or no warning from a prior slowdown, as in 1953 and 1981;
they were long and spread out when protracted slack phases preceded the
downturns. Ifvery early signals are "premature" in the sense oflacking cred-
ibility, PI and P2 in 1956 and PI in 1978 would qualify as such because each
of these events anticipated the corresponding business cycle peaks by more
than a year.
The "band approach" to sequential signaling produced no false alarms at all
during the turbulent years 1976-83 (the first halfofour postsample period).23
This success is probably attributable in part to the fact that no slowdown-
without-recession occurred in that period. But the PI signals also announced
and accompanied the 1984-86 retardation in its first 1.5 years; then T2 and
T3 signals predicted the end of this phase in its last year (table 11.7).24 An-
other PI signal appeared first in November 1987, after the stock market crash,
but it was neither canceled nor confirmed by P2 before the new slowdown,
which is now known to have started in or about February 1989. A P2 warning
flashed in February 1990 but was canceled in May and reinstated in August;
and a P3 signal confirmed the downturn in October.
At business cycle troughs, the first signal (T1) occurs when the L rate rises
across the lower band (0 ± 1%) while the C rate remains less than 1.0%. The
second signal (T2) is given when L rises across the upper band (3.3 ± 1%)
and C rises above 1.0%. The third signal (T3) requires that both Land C cross
the upper band from below, that is, rise above 4.3%. False signals oftroughs
are defined, analogously to those of peaks, as reverse crossing through the
bands. They are infrequent and therefore relatively unimportant. As demon-
strated in table 11.7, the signals of business cycle troughs are less dispersed
but much tardier than those of peaks. Full recognition ofpeaks (P3) required
1-5 months after the event, not long considering the irreducible lags of mea-
surement and detection in noisy data. In contrast, full recognition of troughs
(T3) required 5-13 months (cf. col. 7 in tables 11.6 and 11.7). The longer
lags at troughs simply reflect the lack ofearlier signals from the indicators.
22. Sufficient data are not available to make the calculations for the 1948 peak, but P3 arrived
no later than January 1949 and possibly earlier.
23. The reverse crossings through the bands, which constitute the false signals in this approach,
are very infrequent for both index rates, Land C, whether preliminary or first revised data are
used. Also, the percentages of the observations falling into the two bands have been relatively
small for Land C in 1948-81 (but larger in the 1980s). In contrast, spurious turning-point predic-
tions abound in the alternative "level approach" when currently available preliminary data are
used. In this system, critical levels of 3.3% and 0% perform the functions of the bands 2.3%-
4.3% and -1.0%-+ 1.0%, respectively. When the first revised data are used, which implies a
delay of 1 month, the frequency of false signals is greatly reduced. See Zamowitz and Moore
1982.
24. In growth cycles where no P3 signal is reached, Tl is usually skipped (but see table 11.7,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.345 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
As for the average timing at business cycle peaks, PI led by 7-8 months in
both the sample and the postsample periods, P2 led by 2-4 months, and P3
lagged by 2-3 months. Shorter leads and longer lags characterized the timing
of the same events at growth cycle peaks. T1 tended to signal business cycle
troughs at approximately the time oftheir occurrence, T2 5 months later, and
T3 8 months later. At growth cycle troughs, the leads and lags ofthe T signals
were on average shorter but much more dispersed.
In terms ofthe latest revised data first published by the Department ofCom-
merce in March 1989, the means (standard deviations) ofthe leads or lags of
the signals, in months, are as follows:
At business cycle turns



















These statistics are closely similar to those computed from earlier and prelim-
inary data in tables 11.6 and 11.7 (all discrepancies fall in the range of - 1to
+ 1 months). To be sure, comparisons of individual observations disclose
some larger effects ofthe revisions, but even so, few ofthe differences would
matter greatly.
11.3.3 Probabilities ofRecession and Recovery
Several recent papers discuss the implications of the assumption that mac-
roeconomic variables are subject to two different probability distribution func-
tions, one of which applies in business expansions and the other in contrac-
tions. The switches from the former to the latter or vice versa are supposed to
occur suddenly at random time points and be unobserved; they can only be
inferred from the data according to some model and prediction rules. Thus
Neft~i (1982) splits the data on the composite index of leading indicators for
1948-70 into "downturn regimes" and "upturn regimes," apparently relying
in the main on judgment. He then smoothes the historical frequency distribu-
tions of the monthly changes in the index with a 3-month centered moving
average to estimate the probability distributions separately for the two re-
gimes. His formula for assessing the probability ofrecession is recursive and
dynamic in that it includes the previous month's outcome and cumulates the
probabilities from 0 at the start ofeach expansion to 100% at the end. It also
involves a prior probability distribution based on the assumption that the like-
lihood ofa downturn increases slightly in each month as the expansion ages. 25
25. Let Pt be the probability of an imminent peak this month (Pt-I' last month); let p~ be the
probability that the latest observation came from the distribution for expansions, and p~ that it
came from the distribution for contractions; and let TIt be the prior probability of a peak based
solely on the length ofexpansion to date. Then
[Pt-I +TIt (1 - Pt- I)P~ pt= ....:.....-:.._----O...-.._---.:...--=-----...;; _
[Pt-I +flt(1 - Pt-I)P~] + [(1 - P t-I)P~(1 - fI)]346 Chapter Eleven
A signal ofa nearby recession is issued when the probability computed by the
formula exceeds a preset level ofconfidence. Neft~i, in two illustrations using
the 90% level, shows that the leading index would have given warnings of
recession in August 1973 and April 1979 (1982, pp. 238-40).26
The assumption that the life expectancy ofan expansion is a steadily declin-
ing function of its duration is questionable (see chapter 8, sec. 8.3.5) and so
is Neft~i's judgmental dating, which deviates considerably from the NBER
chronologies. The distinction between business cycles and growth cycles
needs to be made explicit in this context. The target dates are never clearly
defined, which makes it difficult to assess the proposed method and verify its
results (the definition of a recession as two consecutive declines in GNP [see
1982, p. 232] is simply inadequate). But these defects of implementation do
not detract from the importance of Neft~i's basic idea that prediction ofturn-
ing points can be treated as an optimal stopping-time problem (Shiryayev
1978). The concept stimulated much interesting work on how the statistical
technique of sequential analysis can best be used to determine when the cu-
mulative information justifies announcing a turning point, given the cost of a
false signal and a preset margin oferror.
Applying this analysis to the performance ofthe leading index at post-1948
business cycle peaks, Palash and Radecki (1985) report the following esti-
mates, in months: 7/53, -1; 8/57, -14; 4/60, -5; 12/69, -1; 11/73, -3;
1/80, - 6. These lead times do not differ much from those ofthe PI signals in
table 11.6, column 5, but the absence here of any prior warning of the 1981
downturn is troubling. Also, the probability approach produces signals of
slowdowns as well as recessions but, unlike the band approach, does not at-
tempt to distinguish between the two by means ofadditional information. 27
Diebold and Rudebusch 1989 is a comprehensive evaluation of cyclical
turning-point forecasts from historical data on the BEA composite index of
leading indicators for December 1949 to December 1986. The method is a
Bayesian sequential probability recursion (SPR), which retains some aspects
of Neft~i's approach and modifies others. 28 Here all probabilities are used di-
rectly as forecasts, and the stopping rule is not applied. A measure of accu-
racy for a set ofn such forecasts is the quadratic probability score
26. Note the closeness of these dates to their counterparts in table 11.6, cols. 1 and 2 (a PI
signal in 8/73 and a P2 signal in 5/79).
27. Thus the results ofPalash and Radecki include continuous predictions ofrecession from 4/
51 to 5/52 (the slow-growth phase ofthe Korean War cycle; cf. table 11.6, line 1). They also show
a 6-month lead at a misnamed "business cycle peak" of 12/66, which corresponds to the PI signal
of0 at the growth cycle Peak of6/6 in table 11.6.
28. Among the retained elements is the assumption that the composite leading index (CLI) has
the following simple probability structure: ~CLI = Ct U + £~ in expansions; ~ CLI = Ctd +
£1 in contractions (where the Ct's are constants and the £'s are independently and identically distrib-
uted random variables with means of0). The densities corresponding to the two regimes,t and
fd, are estimated by fitting normal distribution functions to the CLI data partitioned according to
the specific-cycle peaks and troughs in the index that match the NBER business cycle turns. The
probability of a turning point is taken to be indePendent of the duration of the phase; hence the
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where rt is the realization corresponding to the predicted probability, Pt (it
equals 1 when a turning point has occurred and 0 otherwise). QPS has a range
from 0 (best) to 2 (worst). A measure of calibration (i.e., closeness of pre-
dicted probabilities to observed relative frequencies) is the global squared
bias, GSB = 2(p - f)2, where p and f are means ofPt and rt , respectively.
GSB, too, ranges from 0 to 2. Forecasts are also scored on other criteria,
notably their local discriminating power, or resolution, which reflects the ex-
tent to which different probability values are followed by different realiza-
tions. All scores are for several forecast horizons (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 13
months). Only symmetric loss functions are considered. 29 However, the per-
formance of the leading indicators tends to be asymmetric and such that the
index would presumably score better ifmissing a true tum mattered more than
calling a false tum.
The SPR forecast scores on accuracy (QPS) at peaks increase from .29 for
the shortest to .49 for the longest horizon. Surprisingly, these results are worse
than those obtained from the simple rule that yields probabilities of 1 when
the leading index shows three consecutive declines (3CD) and of0 otherwise
(the scores for these 3CD forecasts increase from .19 to .34 in the 1-9 months
range). Even the naive forecast of zero probability of a downturn throughout
earns lower (i.e., better) scores than SPR. The optimal constant-probability
forecast, where the constant is chosen to minimize QPS for expansions, per-
forms much better than any of these methods. However, constant priors can
be found that optimize the posterior probability predictions via SPR, and this
method (SPR*) produces about equally good results (scores of .04-.39).
Also, both SPR and SPR* show higher relative accuracy when the LPS mea-
sures are substituted for QPS (see n. 29), whereas 3CD performs poorly here.
At troughs, SPR* generally scores best; the naive forecast worst. The opti-
mal constant-probability forecast for contractions comes in a close second;
SPR third. The scores generally increase with the horizon in the range of 1-7
months (e.g., from .27 to .48 for SPR under QPS). 30
The SPR predictions tend to overpredict the probabilities ofturning points;
the naive no-change predictions obviously underpredict them. All other ex-
amined types offorecast, from the simple 3CD rule to the sophisticated SPR*,
are well-calibrated or unbiased (i.e., have GSB ~ 0 for all horizons). The
resolution scores show SPR and SPR* to be moderately and about equally
informative, whereas the naive and constant-probability forecasts are, of
course, by their very nature ofno value in this respect.
29. They are implied by both QPS and an alternative, the log probability score (LPS). The LPS
penalizes large errors more heavily than QPS does, and so the absolute level ofthe scores tends to
be higher for LPS than for QPS (cf. tables 1and 2 in Diebold and Rudebusch 1989, p. 382).
30. The longer predictions show improvements that are correctly recognized as artificial. Be-
cause the postwar recessions were short (all but one less than a year), it was easy to predict that
they would end after 9 or 11 months.348 Chapter Eleven
In absolute terms, all predictive techniques performed worse in contrac-
tions (at troughs) than in expansions (at peaks). In relative terms, the SPR
method performed best in contractions. The longer their horizon (time span to
target), the less accurate would the probabilistic turning-point predictions typ-
ically be. This is a general property of optimal forecasts and a widely ob-
served regularity, as documented in part IV ofthis book.
The Diebold and Rudebusch 1989 analysis is ex post in the sense that their
probability densities are estimated over the entire sample and their data on the
leading index represent the latest "final" revisions. An ex ante evaluation
based on rolling probability densities, preliminary and partially revised data,
and the SPR method (Diebold and Rudebusch 1991) yields closer approxi-
mations to real-time out-of-sample forecasts. Not surprisingly, the so-con-
structed ex ante forecasts are less accurate than their ex post counterparts. The
main reason is probably data errors rather than pure forecast errors. As we
have seen, not only are the component series of the leading index subject to
frequent short-term statistical revisions but they have not all been available in
time for inclusion in the first preliminary values of the index; moreover, the
composition of the index itself was altered on several occasions. The proba-
bility forecasts based on preliminary data reflect all these measurement errors
and could be very sensitive to the compositional changes in particular. But the
NBER business cycle turning-point dates (the target of these forecasts) are
established retrospectively, in light of historical, revised information. Many
important macroeconomic series (e.g., real GNP) undergo repeated and often
relatively large revisions, and forecasters on the whole predict the future val-
ues ofthese variables better in preliminary than in revised form. 31
Hamilton (1989) applies a nonlinear iterative filter to quarterly growth rates
in real GNP for 1952-84and reports the maximum likelihood estimates ofthe
parameters of the underlying process. He notes that one possible outcome of
this use of Markov switching regression to infer regime changes might have
been an identification ofabove-trend ("fast") and below-trend ("slow") growth
phases. However, this was not the case; instead, the best fit to the data sepa-
rated periods ofpositive growth from periods ofnegative growth (recession).
Indeed, the dates of the switches determined by this method agree quite well
with the NBER business cycle chronology. 32
Hamilton's statistical analysis extends that of Neft~i. That its results agree
so well with the results ofthe historical NBER studies is remarkable. But here
again it is well to remember that the focus of all of this work is on the U.S.
31. For evidence, see Zamowitz 1967 and R. Cole 1969a; for more on the general properties of
macroeconomic forecasts, see part IV below. True ex ante predictions must use preliminary data
for the most recent periods, and the effective weight ofthis information will often be large. Thus
the forecasts are apt to have more in common with the early than with the later revised values of
the target variables.
32. The only large discrepancies are associated with Hamilton's peak dates of 1957:1 and
1979:2, which coincide with oil price increases (the NBER dates are 1957:3 and 1980:1). Else-
where the differences are mostly zero; in a few cases, ± 1quarter.349 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
business cycle chronology derived from ex post information. Slowdowns are
more frequent than recessions, the two are not so easily distinguishable on a
current basis, and leading indicators are sensitive to both. Growth cycles at-
tract much popular and official attention, particularly abroad, and the concept
receives support from some contemporary theories. The leading and confirm-
ing indicators in Europe and Japan are mostly geared to fluctuations in devia-
tions from trend.
Niemira 1991, using the Neft~i method, finds the timing of the probability
signals from the Department ofCommerce index ofleading indicators to have
been on average coincident with U.S. growth cycle turning points in 1951-
86. 33 The individual signals show considerable dispersion, however, particu-
larly at peaks. The 1962-64 growth cycle was missed. On the whole, the
slowdowns and speedups might often have been recognized with relatively
little delay but seldom detected early. Much the same can be said about the
applications ofthe method to Japan and West Germany (where short lags pre-
vail) and the United Kingdom (where the lags are longer).
In short, the probability approach has a broad appeal a priori on general
statistical grounds and helps extend the range ofuses ofthe leading indexes.
Still, its results can only be as good as the predictive potential ofthese indexes
allows. This is true as well for the method of sequential signaling by leading
and coincident index growth rates, which retains its usefulness. 34
11.3.4 Regression-Based Approaches
Leading indexes and their components can be used to predict not only turn-
ing points but also future values ofmacroeconomic aggregates with coincident
timing tendencies. For example, consider the ordinary regression of dqt on
det_I' where d denotes first differences in logs (dIn) and q refers to real GNP
and erefers to the index of leading indicators. Let the parameter estimates
based on quarterly data for 1948-69 be used to compute one-quarter-ahead
forecasts of real growth in 1970-76, and then reestimate for 1948-70 and
1971-76 and so on. As shown in Vaccara and Zarnowitz 1978, this very
simple procedure yields root mean square errors of about .01 (close to the
standard errors of regression) and mean errors near O. The correlations be-
tween-the out-of-sample predictions and realizations range from .68 to .74.
Adding dqt-1' det- 2, and det- 3 does not improve the results significantly, but
adding lagged changes in the inverted lagging index, dv, does. A chain of
predictions can extend the span of forecasts ofreal growth: dqt+2 is obtained
from det+I' which is itself obtained from dvt. Measures of relative accuracy
33. Whether the confidence levels of90% or 95% are used apparently makes little difference,
and Niemira opts for the latter. The growth cycle chronology is that used in studies ofthe NBER
and the Centerfor International Business Cycle Research (CIBCR). Comparisons with otherchro-
nologies such as Beveridge and Nelson 1981 are shown to yield much worse results.
34. See section 11.3.2 above on the application of this method to U.S. business and growth
cycles. Reports by Moore on the continuing work at the CIBCR indicate that applications to other
countries also provide useful information on their growth cycle developments.350 Chapter Eleven
suggest that the forecasts with composite indexes are definitely "in the ball
park," that is, not at all far behind the much more complex and expensive GNP
forecasts ofeconometricians and business economists. 35
Auerbach (1982) estimates jointly (1) the regression of a cyclical variable
dy on its own lagged values and on those ofthe leading index, de, and (2) the
regression of de on its component series. Monthly rates of change in either
the unemployment rate or the industrial production index serve as dy, monthly
rates of change in the BEA index of 1975 vintage serve as de, and the lags
range from 1 to 10 months. The weights estimated from Auerbach's equation
(2) for the sample period 1949-77 vary considerably across the index compo-
nents and differ depending on which ofthe two cyclical variables is used. The
regression weights help to obtain a better within-sample fit for the unemploy-
ment rate, but the BEA index with approximately equal weights performs
better in out-of-sample predictions for both variables. These results prove ro-
bust to different choices of sample period (1949-73, 1968-73) and forecast
period (1973-77 and subdivisions). The stability of equations is rejected
when using the estimated index with "optimal" regression weights but ac-
cepted when using the BEA index. Exclusion ofthose component series that
did not individually help explain dy worsens the out-of-sample prediction per-
formance ofthe BEA index.
Leading indicators contribute to the determination of national output and
some other major economic aggregates in vector autoregressive (VAR) mod-
els, as shown in chapter 12. Continuing work in this area, conducted by me
jointly with Phillip Braun, is now producing updated regression estimates and
out-of-sample predictions with selected indexes. The latter include combina-
tions of new-investment commitments for plant and equipment and housing
((2) and ofmost ofthe other components ofthe BEA leading index used in the
late 1970s and 1980s «(s). Table 11.8 compares forecasts from four VAR mod-
els. The first model (A) includes real growth, inflation, money growth, and
the interest rate; another (B) adds (2; the third (C) adds e s instead; and the
fourth (D) includes all six variables. The sample period is 1949-82; the fore-
cast period is 1983-89.
The ratios of model B to model A root mean square errors (RMSE) show
that whene 2 is included, forecasts ofreal growth (q) improve for the first three
quarters but deteriorate for longer spans. Interestingly, (2 helps to raise the
accuracy of forecasts of inflation (p) and the level of interest rates (I) at all
horizons (cols. 1-3). The RMSE ratios for CIA tell us that (s contributes to
the forecasts ofq over quarters 1-4, to those ofp over some intermediate and
longer spans, and to those oflover most spans. However, most of the CIA
35. Leading indicator predictions of changes in the coincident index (de) were on the whole
more accurate than the predictions ofdq, according to the results by Vaccara and Zamowitz. One
possible reason is that the coincident index has smaller measurement errors than real GNP; an-
other, that it has more ofa tendency to lag slightly. (Errors in component series often average out
in an index, and employment lags slightly behind output much ofthe time.)351 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
Table 11.8 Measures ofNet Predictive Value ofVAR Models with and without Selected
Leading Indexes: Forecasts for 1-12 Quarters Ahead, 1983-89
Ratios ofRoot Mean Square Errors (%)
Model B/Model A Model C/Model A Model D/Model A
Span in q p 1 q P 1 q P 1
Quarters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One 81 83 93 93 100 92 83 80 91
Two 86 82 96 96 103 100 96 81 102
Three 76 89 96 95 99 97 82 89 101
Four 101 90 92 98 98 94 99 90 92
Five 114 92 92 110 100 81 117 90 89
Six 125 94 94 110 99 94 122 91 93
Nine 102 94 95 123 97 94 117 92 91
Twelve 102 96 97 107 99 95 101 96 92
Note: Model A includes four variables: q, m, I, and p. Model B includes the same variables plus 1 2,
Model C replaces 1 2 with 19. Model D includes all six variables: q, m, I, p, 1 2, and 19. The variables are
defined as follows (~ln = first difference in natural logarithm): q = ~In real GNP; m = ~In money
supply MI; 1 = commercial paper rate; p = ~ln GNP implicit price deflator; 1 2 = ~In index of new-
investment commitments (contracts and orders for plant and equipment; building permits for private
housing); 19 = ~ln index ofeight leading indicators (average workweek, manufacturing; average initial
claims for state unemployment insurance; vendor performance-percentage of companies receiving
slower deliveries; change in sensitive materials prices; new orders for consumer goods and materials,
constant dollars, manufacturing industries; index of net business formation; change in inventories on
hand and on order, constant dollars, manufacturing and trade; index of500 common stock prices). Cols.
I, 4, 7 refer to forecasts of real GNP growth; cols. 2, 5, and 8, to forecasts of ipflation; cols. 3, 6, and
9, to forecasts ofthe interest rate.
ratios are higher than the corresponding B/A ratios, which suggests that the
net predictive value ofe g is less than that ofe 2 (cf. cols. 1-3 and 4-6). When
bothe 2 and e g are included, some gains are achieved, particularly in forecast-
ing p, as indicated by the D/A ratios (cols. 7-9). It might appear that the
contributions ofe 2 and e g are small (most ofthe ratios, in percentages, are in
the 90s), but one should remember that the benchmark VAR model A is not
an easy one to beat (consisting as it does of four principal macroeconomic
variables, each quarterly series being taken with four lags, plus constant terms
and time trends). 36
Finally, Diebold and Rudebusch in their most recent evaluation (1990b)
look at the contribution ofthe Department ofCommerce leading index (LI) to
monthly forecasts ofindustrial production (IP) that also use the lagged values
of IP. They report that LI has a considerable net predictive value when both
series (used in logarithms ofthe levels) are taken in the "final" revised form,
but not when LI is the preliminary series and IP is the revised one. In the latter
36. The autoregressive elements are particularly strong for p, m, and 1 but relatively weak for
q, 1 2, and 19, as indicated by F-statistics. The most significant influences on q are those of the
interest rate and the leading indexes, Compare the similar results ofthe F- and t-tests reported in
chapter 12.352 Chapter Eleven
case, ofcourse, the past LI values would be available to the "real-time" fore-
caster but the past IP values would not. Here again, my interpretation oftheir
results is that they primarily reflect the measurement errors in the preliminary
LI series (as in Diebold and Rudebusch 1989; see sec. 11.3.3 above).
11.4 Recent and Expected Innovations
11.4.1 New Methods and Experimental Indexes
An experimental index ofcoincident indicators by Stock and Watson (1989,
1991a) is built on the assumption that all comovements of the included time
series are attributable to a single unobserved factor (the "aggregate economic
activity" or "state ofthe economy"). 37 The underlying linear stochastic model
is specified in log differences, so the common dynamic factor is ~lnC t; in
addition, the relative change in each of the coincident variables covered is
supposed to include a random component U t that collects the variable-specific
movements and measurement errors. The u's are thought of as uncorrelated
with ~lnCt' with each other across the component series, and over time, at all
leads and lags.
The Stock-Watson (S-W) coincident index includes four series, three of
which it shares with the BEA index. One series is slightly different (em-
ployee-hours are used by S-Wand number of employees by BEA, both for
the nonfarm sector). The two indexes are very similar but the cyclical move-
ments are somewhat smaller in the S-W composite and the upward trend is
weaker (Stock and Watson 1989, p. 366).
The S-W formalization of the coincident index is methodologically inter-
esting but rather restrictive. It certainly does not imply that business cycles
have a single common cause, or that they can be reliably dated according to
the movements ofa single coincident index, BEA or S-W (cf. Stock and Wat-
son 1989, pp. 352-55; Zamowitz and Braun 1989, p. 399). A broader range
ofvariables, nominal as well as real, would require more than one factor.
The new S-W leading index is both conceptually and structurally very dif-
ferent from the older NBER and BEA indexes. Calculated from a modified
VAR model with seven selected leading variables, it is a forecast of the 6-
month-ahead growth rate ofthe S-W coincident index (InCt+ 61t - InCtl). The
selection involved an extensive search through a large array of series limited
to the sample period 1960-88, using models with up to nine lags in each of
the leading series and four lags in ~lnC. Stock and Watson recognize that the
danger of overfitting is particularly large here (1989, p. 367). A good in-
sample fit would be expected and is largely confirmed (Zamowitz and Braun
37. See Sargent and Sims 1977 for an early study ofan unobserved one-index model ofmulti-
variate time series.353 Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
1989). But in the absence of out-of-sample tests, doubts arise about just how
well this index would have performed over past periods with very different
characteristics or how well it will do in the future.
The S-W leading index includes no series on money and credit, inventory
investment, consumption, delivery lags, sensitive commodity prices, and
stock prices. Three of its seven components relate to interest rates: change in
the 10-year Treasury bond yield (1 10); the 6-month risk spread, commercial
paper rate minus Treasury bill rate (CP - TB); and the yield curve, 10-year to
I-year Treasury bond spread (GI0 - Gl). The other components are the
building permits for private housing units (BP); 'manufacturers' unfilled orders
for durable goods, in constant dollars (DUO); the trade-weighted nominal ex-
change rate (EXN); and part-time work in nonagricultural industries due to
slack (PTW). BP is a level series; the others are smoothed growth rates.
Only two ofthe seven S-W leaders are also included in the BEA index (BP
and DUO, but the latter in the form of absolute change, not rate of growth).
A series such as EXN, with a short and poor record of cyclical conformity
and timing, would not have qualified under the selection criteria used in the
indexes constructed in the past (Moore and Shiskin 1967; Zamowitz and Bos-
chan 1975a, 1975b). Although theoretical considerations support inclusion of
this important variable, they do so equally for other variables that have been
omitted, particularly those relating to real investment, profits, credit, and
money.
The level of interest rates tends to move procyclically with lags (the prime
rate is a component of the BEA index of lagging indicators), but as shown
earlier, such laggers when inverted become long leaders. The 110 component
contributes only mildly to the S-W index. 38 The yield curve (GI0 - Gl) is
more effective, and the public-private spread (CP - TB) is by far the most
effective, according to the tests reported by S-W and Zamowitz and Braun
1989 (but see sec. 11.4.3 below for some qualifications).
The S-W leading index would probably gain from broader and more diver-
sified coverage, including at least some of the more effective components of
the BEA index. Its reliance on interest rates and spreads seems too heavy: the
predictive power of these variables in the past was not always as strong as in
recent times, and it may not always prove as strong in the future (Sims 1989,
pp. 396-97). Indeed, the S-W index failed to predict the July 1990 business
cycle peak. However, most leading indicators performed rather poorly on this
occasion. (Stock and Watson 1991b), perhaps because the 1991 downtum was
aggravated and accelerated (though not necessarily caused) by the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait on August 2. The BEA leading index declined in July, syn-
chronously with the general economic activity.
38. See, e.g., fig. 5(F) in Stock and Watson 1989, p. 371. Also, note that "interestingly, includ-
ing a measure ofex ante real rates (with various measures ofexpected inflation) does not improve
the performance ofthe LEI [i.e., S-W] index" (p. 385).354 Chapter Eleven
11.4.2 Do Stock Prices Belong in the Leading Index?
Probably no major leading indicator met with more criticism in recent times
than the stock price index (particularly after the crash ofOctober 1987). Stock
prices reflect profit expectations and presumably help determine consumption
(wealth effect) and cost of capital, hence business investment decisions (q-
ratio). Some studies offer strong support for the power of market changes to
predict output (Fama 1981; Fischer and Merton 1984); others provide mixed
evidence on the theoretical consequences of stock price movements (see ref-
erences in chapter 2 and Cagan 1990). The verdict of most recent tests is
essentially negative. 39
I find the long-term cyclical record of stock prices as leading indicators in
the United States and other developed economies (Canada, Japan, and West-
ern Europe) to be good in the relevant relative terms. The market indexes have
performed worse than the composite indexes, but this is true ofother individ-
ual indicators as well. Their recent record leaves much to be desired, but it
would seem premature to eliminate the S&P 500 index from the U.S. leading
index. As summed up in table 11.9, all but three ofthe U.S. business contrac-
tions since 1873 were preceded and accompanied by substantial declines in
the market. 40 So stock prices signaled well the actual recessions and recover-
ies. However, they performed poorly with respect to the other type oferror by
giving many false signals (i.e., containing many extra turns). Of the 12 sig-
nificant declines in the S&P index in 1946-82, 5 (42%) were not associated
with recessions. Interestingly, the conformity of stock prices to business
cycles, as measured by both types of error, was excellent in 1873-1919 and
much worse in the later era ofthe Federal Reserve and rising government size
and interventions (cf. table 11.9, cols. 4 and 5). Yet one should also consider
that the tendency of the market to lead actually strengthened in the postwar
period (coIs. 6-7). Also, the market declines associated with recessions and
major slowdowns were typically larger and longer than the other declines. 41
11.4.3 New Proposals and Need for Further Work
The study by Stock and Watson suggests that the BEA index could be sig-
nificantly improved by the inclusion of some functions of interest rates, par-
39. Stock and Watson (1989, p. 388) conclude that the marginal predictive value ofS&P 500 in
helping to predict their coincident index is "modest." Fredman and Niemira (1990), working with
the components ofthe latest BEA composite index ofleading indicators, consider the same stock
price series the main candidate for replacement. For a rather more optimistic appraisal, however,
see Niemira 1990a.
40. The exceptions consist of the mild, indeed marginal, recession of 1926-27, the short one
in the first halfof 1980, and the 1945 episode related to the end ofWorld War II.
41. The bear markets in 1962 and 1966 are related to business slowdowns; those in 1946, 1977,
and 1983-84 are not. The outliers are the short but steep decline in 1962 and the long but gradual
decline in 1976-78. The average amplitudes per month ofcyclical contractions in common stock
prices are close to 2% for each ofthe three subperiods distinguished in table 11.9. Formore detail
on timing and amplitudes ofstock price indexes in the United States, see Moore 1983, ch. 9, and
Zamowitz 1987-88. On the timing ofmarket indexes at postwar growth cycle turns in eight coun-
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Table 11.9 Selected Measures ofCyclical Conformity and TIming, Common Stock
Prices, 1873-1986
No. ofTurning
Points Covered in % ofLeads!
No. of % %
Stock Price B.C. and S.C. ofB.C. ofExtra At At
Business Cycles Turning Points Turns S.C. B.C. B.C.
Cycles (B.C.)a (S.C.)b Matchedc Skippedd Turnse Peaks Troughs
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1873-1919 24 24 24 0 0 83 75
1920-1945 12 10 8 33 20 75 75
1946-1986 16 24 14 13 42 100 100
1873-1986 52 58 46 12 21 87 83
Sources: Morgenstern 1959, ch. 10; Moore 1983, ch. 9; BCD, April 1987, p. 105; Zamowitz 1987-88,
p.14.
aAs dated by the NBER. Every entry includes an equal number ofB.C. peaks and B.C. troughs.
bRefers to specific-cycle peaks and troughs (in equal numbers for every entry) in the S&P monthly index
of common stock prices. For 1873-1919: index compiled by Cowles Commission and S&P, includes
virtually all industrial public utility, and railroad stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. For
1918-56: monthly average ofS&P weekly index, coverage increasing from 198 to 480 stocks. 1957-86:
S&P index of500 common stocks.
cB.C. turns matched by like turns in the monthly S&P 500 index.
dEquals in terms ofthe column numbers [(1) - (2)/(1)]100.
eEquals in terms ofthe column numbers [(2) - (3)/(2)]100.
fBased on all timing observations at matched B.C. and S.C. turns (see cols. 3 for the numbers and nn.
a-e).
ticularly the risk spread. Some measure of the slope ofthe yield curve is an-
other candidate that receives support from both historical analyses (Kes-
sel 1965; Cagan 1966) and recent tests (Keen 1989; Fredman and Niemira
1990).
Corporate bond prices led at each peak and each trough of the eight com-
plete business cycles of 1948-82, but they have a much longer record ofcon-
sistent cyclical behavior (Mitchell and Bums 1938). The Dow-Jones index, a
simple average ofdaily closing bond prices for each month, had very long and
highly variable leads at peaks (with a mean and a range of 27 and 10-58
months, respectively). Its leads at troughs were more moderate but also long
relative to the observed distributions of such leads and the durations ofbusi-
ness contractions (they ranged from 3 to 13 months and averaged 7 months).
Bond prices, ofcourse, move inversely to bond yields. Their long downward
trend in the postwar period reflects the rise in the price level and the gradual
diffusion ofinflationary expectations. 42
The Dow-Jones bond price average is included in the new long-leading in-
dex ofthe CIBCR along with the money supply (M2) in constant dollars, new
housing permits, and the ratio of the price to unit labor cost in manufactur-
42. Fordetail on corporate bond prices as a leading indicator, see Zamowitz 1990.356 Chapter Eleven
ing. 43 The long-leading index is designed to help remedy the old problem of
very short leads at business cycle troughs ofthe existing composites. It is also
intended to provide a forecasting tool with a somewhat longer forward reach
and to be tested against the movements in the short-leading index (and vice
versa). Its peaks (troughs) lead the corresponding turns in the BEA index on
average by 4 (5) months (see Moore and Cullity 1990).
Seven ofthe 11 components ofthe new short-leading CIBCR index are the
same as or nearly equivalent to the indicators included in the BEA leading
index in its present form. The remaining components include a new index of
net business formation, a new layoff rate series, growth rate in real domestic
nonfinancial debt, and the diffusion index of inventory change from the
monthly survey ofthe National Association ofPurchasing Management. Each
of these series represents an important cyclical variable with a tendency to
lead well known from the results ofclosely related data used in the past. 44
With larger samples ofbetter data and a careful choice ofevaluation meth-
ods, we should be able to draw important distinctions between types of fluc-
tuations and turning points. As noted earlier, some indicators lead only at
peaks, others only at troughs, and neither ofthese groups should be ignored.
Also, some indicators may rank high as predictors ofbusiness cycle turns but
low as predictors ofgrowth cycle turns, or vice versa. 45
Much more work needs to be done to extend and improve the set ofuseful
indicators of major changes in general economic activity. This applies not
only to the leading series but also to the roughly coincident and lagging series.
43. The first two ofthese series are also components ofthe BEA leading index (with the minor
difference that BEA uses an index ofpermits, and CIBCR uses the number ofpermits). The ratio
series is a new monthly indicatorofprofit margins (see Boschan and Moore 1990).
44. Foranalyses ofthese indicators, see Moore 1990, ch. 2; Moore and Cullity 1990; Klein and
Moore 1990; and Zamowitz and Moore 1990. Forcriticism ofthe two series included in the BEA
index but not in the CIBCR indexes (change in constant-dollar unfilled orders for durable goods
and the index ofconsumerexpectations), see Moore 1990, pp. 12-14.
45. Fredman and Niemira 1990 evaluate 17 leading indicators separately at the two sets ofturns
in 1948-82, using a Neft~i-type technique. In signaling business cycle turns, the ratio of the
coincident to the lagging index ranks first, the yield curve second, /10 fourth, the BEA leading
index fifth, and the "credit risk" (CP - TB) last. In signaling growth cycle turns, the BEA leading
index ranks first, credit risk fifth, the yield curve eleventh, /10 fifteenth, and the C/Lg ratio last!